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Abstract 
The dominant theme within extant research on performance and ranking conceptualises the 
organisational response to a ranking as one where it responds by ‘conforming’ to the measure 
(Korberger and Carter 2010, Scott and Orlikowski 2012, Shore and Wright 2015). This process of 
‘reactivity’ (Espeland and Sauder 2007), however, is not always possible, especially in the complex 
and rapidly-changing settings described in this paper. In certain contexts organisations are typically 
surrounded by multiple measures, raising the question as to which they should align. Drawing on an 
ethnographic study across a number of sites, we show how some organisations instead of 
conforming to a single measure are ‘transforming’ to respond to the challenge of multiple rankings, 
by constructing and elaborating new forms of expertise, knowledge and connection with rankers. 
Unlike prior research that presents organisations as constrained by systems of measuring (which we 
name ‘reactive conformance’), we examine how they are becoming more proactive towards this 
challenge (described as ‘reflexive transformation’). Specifically, building on themes from accounting 
and the ‘sociology of worth', we present evidence that organisations exercise greater choice than 
expected about which rankings they respond to, shape their ranked positions, as well as wield 
influence over assessment criteria and the wider evaluative ecosystem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few aspects of the economy and society remain untouched by potent performance measures of one form or 
another. Performance information is exerting an increasingly profound influence on organisations and 
institutions, whereby it contributes towards shaping not only strategies but also structures and practices 
(Shore and Wright 2015). The increasing diffusion and popularity of rankings – and other kinds of ratings, 
such as metrics, certifications and league tables – is reflected in growing attempts by academics to theorise 
their influence on targeted organisations. Espeland and Sauder (2007) sharpened our understanding of how 
audit and rankings influence by distinguishing between their intended consequences (e.g. to offer new 
information about ‘performance’ and ‘quality’) and their unintended ones (e.g. how they often alter the 
thing they hope to measure). The real import of a ranking for these authors is not just the flood of demands 
for transparency and accountability, what Power (1997) depicted as the ‘audit society’ (Power 1997), 
Humphrey and Owen (2000) the ‘performance measurement society’, and Dahler-Larsen (2012) the 
‘evaluation society’, but how they can encourage ranked organisations to adjust towards the instruments. It 
is through a process described as ‘reactivity' (Espeland and Sauder 2007) that rank positions are maintained 
or improved. Reactivity captures the way organisations remodel themselves to conform more closely to 
‘evaluative templates' (Wedlin 2006, 2007). For example, Espeland and Sauder (2007) have shown how 
university law schools adapted strategies and activities to align with the principles embodied in the US News 
law school ranking.  
How rankings encourage reflexive behaviours has also become a key focus for accounting scholars and 
others (Jeacle and Carter 2011, Scott and Orlikowski 2012, Pollock and D’Adderio 2012, Mehrpouya and 
Samiolo 2016). Scott and Orlikowski (2012: 38), for instance, note how hotels have become “acutely 
attuned” to the review site TripAdvisorand and will use this to “evaluate and revise their own organisational 
practices”. However, the evidence presented here suggests that, in focusing predominately on how 
organisations align with a ranking, scholars have only captured one facet of reactivity thus far. We argue that 
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more recent evidence is beginning to question just how far the notion of responding by conforming helps 
explain the current challenges raised by ranking systems.  
The increasingly important test facing organisations today is that rankings are both broadening and 
deepening their coverage. They seem, on the one hand, to be multiplying. Shore and Wright (2015: 426) talk 
of a “new industry of measuring and ranking”. Dahler-Larsen (2012: 227) suggests that actors in this industry 
‘never sleep’ since they “constantly come up with new models, approaches, and ways to evaluate”. Fueled 
also by the possibilities offered by new social media technologies (Bialecki, O’Leary and Smith 2017), it is 
now common for an organisation to be ranked many times over (Sauder and Espeland 2006, Brandtner 
2016). Rankings, on the other hand, seem to be becoming more relevant. No matter whether online or 
offline, they are thought to have immediate and decisive influence (Adkins and Lury 2011, Jeacle and Carter 
2011, Scott and Orlikowski 2012). This suggests that no organisation can afford to ignore a ranking as being 
positioned below a rival, or failing to appear on a measure, could directly affect standing (Schultz, Mouritsen 
and Gabrielsen 2001), market position (Fombrum 1996),  consumer decision-making (Blank 2006), and 
service providers’ practices (Scott and Orlikowski 2012). 
This, therefore, raises an important question: how might an organisation respond in the case of multiple 
rankings? In the presence of multiple measures to which should they react? One reading of the reactivity 
thesis is that to engage with one (or a few related) ranking(s) an organisation allows specific evaluative 
criteria(s) to guide its behaviour. This, however, leaves the question open as to what might happen when 
organisations are confronted with a multiplicity of different ranking templates. In the latter case simply 
conforming would be implausible. An entity reacting equally and indiscriminately to increased and diverse 
pressures would risk being pulled in different directions (Stark 2009). This suggests that something else 
might be happening, e.g., that a plurality of performance systems might produce different effects on 
organisations than the relatively straightforward conformance theorised in extant literature (Greenwood et 
al., 2011). Precisely how does an organisation respond to multiple – and potentially inconsistent - ranking 
systems? 
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In this paper, we address this question through an ethnographic study based on the in-depth analysis of 
several ranked organisations countering and interacting with numerous rankers. By exploiting this privileged 
form of access we acquire a window onto, first, the processes of change occurring within ranked 
organisations, which includes how they build new forms of expertise and knowledge, and, second, the 
various practices developed by an emergent category of specialist known as ‘analyst relations' or ‘influencer 
relations'. We present evidence that organisations are now able to exercise greater choice about which 
rankings they respond to, that they are often able to shape their ranked positions, wield influence over 
assessment criteria and, in some cases, positively influence the wider evaluative ecosystem in their favour. In 
doing so we provide a counter to those who present the organisational response to rankings as ‘defensive' 
(Strathern 1997, Espeland and Sauder 2007, Dahler-Larsen 2012). Through linking developments in 
accounting scholarship with similar advances in organisational studies (Greenwood et al., 2011) and 
valuation studies (Stark 2009), we show that, with regard to this challenge, ranked organisations are 
becoming more ‘proactive' (Wedlin 2006, Mennicken 2010). 
THERE IS NO MEASURE WITHOUT A RESPONSE 
Rankings are not new. There has long been credit ratings of institutions and states (Boot, Milbourn and 
Schmeits 2006), consumer-oriented rankings of performing and visual arts (Becker 1984, Shrum 1996) and 
high-value goods such as wine (Odorici and Corrado 2004). Over the past two decades, however, there has 
been an ‘explosion’ in the number and type of ranking and indicator (Dahler-Larsen 2012). This includes 
rankings to measure the quality of films and music (Karpik 2010, Bialecki, O’Leary and Smith 2017), 
restaurants (Blank 2006), the top consumer products to buy (Aldridge 1994), the best cities to live and work 
in (Kornberger and Carter 2010), the standing of a company in relation to competitors (Schultz, Mouritsen 
and Gabrielsen 2001), and the past or projected performance of organizations such as schools (Wedlin 
2006), universities (Free, Salterio and Shearer 2009), auditor firms (Mennicken 2010), and investment banks 
(Podolny 1993). 
An initial wave of studies, because of the new kinds of information demanded and provided, emphasised the 
radical potential of rankings to reshape organisations (Power 1997, Humphrey and Owen 2000, Dahler-
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Larsen 2012). Hazelkorn (2011) describes how rankings force ‘profound transformation' across institutions 
and organisations. Kwon and Easton (2010: 124) portray rankings as an exogenous factor driving 
organisational and economic action. Control over key information was said to allow the rankers the ability to 
exert authority over a space (Burrows 2012), to make domains governable through creating an 'iron cage' 
(Erkkilä and Piironen 2009) of fixed and standard measures. Rankers could become "...powerful to the point 
where they were able to monopolise the information required for the efficient functioning of markets and 
thereby influence the behaviour of other market actors" (Kwon and Easton 2010: 124). 
Other contributions, however, have taken issue with this simplified narrative, arguing that rankings have 
brought not a radical shift, but a more gradual evolution in organisational processes.  
Rankings create reflexive behaviours 
In a further stream of studies, what scholars have found of interest is the apparent capacity of rankings to 
invoke in organisations the tendency to change themselves. Rather than this description of rankings as an 
autonomous, monopolistic mechanism imposing change, it was suggested that they become powerful and 
influential by their ability to encourage processes of ‘reflexivity'. Strathern (1997: 308) was amongst the first 
to develop the idea that when a feature of an organisation was singled out for audit that it ceases to 
function as before since actors will change their behaviour towards it (see also Hoskin 1996). “Targets that 
seem measurable”, she wrote, “become enticing tools for improvement”. This idea found much support, not 
just within accounting circles, but across management disciplines. Organisational scholars showed how the 
pressure aroused by a poor rating was such that entities were often 'compelled' to improve performance for 
fear of stakeholder sanction (Chatterji and Toffel 2010). Similarly, it was argued that rankings could be 
‘fetishized’ by those subject to them (Willmott 2011). ‘Fear of falling’ (Sauder and Espeland 2007: 1) on a 
ranking was seen to constitute a peculiar type of pressure – one which organisations often found difficult to 
‘buffer’ (Sauder and Espeland 2009).  
The current focus of debate is therefore that audit and rankings cannot be separated from understandings of 
how organisation respond. Scholars have also argued for better analytical templates to capture reflexive 
behaviours. Dahler-Larsen (2012: 218), for example, called for investigations of rankings and "the broader 
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social processes triggered by the evaluation itself". In perhaps the most advanced study of this kind, 
Espeland and Sauder (2007) describe the ‘mechanisms of reactivity' that can ensue after a ranking is 
introduced. They define reactivity as "the idea that people change their behaviour in reaction to being 
evaluated, observed, or measured" (ibid: 1). Their study shows how rankings “evoke self-fulfilling prophecies 
that gradually transform law schools into entities that conform more closely to the criteria used to construct 
rankings” (ibid: 33, our emphasis). They see reactivity as having three aspects: it affects how organisational 
resources are allocated, leads to the shifting of work practices, and encourages the proliferation of ‘gaming 
strategies’. In terms of this last aspect, they define gaming as about “managing appearances and involves 
efforts to improve ranking factors without improving the characteristics the factors are designed to 
measure” (ibid: 29).  
Espeland and Sauder (ibid) see reactivity as part of the broader notion of ‘reflexivity’, and call for those 
interested in audit and valuation processes to be more systematic about its study. Versions of what we 
might describe as the ‘reflexive conformance’ thesis have been deployed to good effect across different 
empirical and disciplinary areas. Writing about university business schools, for instance, Wedlin argues that 
they “have accepted the ranking as an arena and have been shown to adapt, at least partially, to the 
template, and to the criteria specified in the rankings” (2006: 150, our emphasis). Gioia and Corley similarly 
suggest that “[…] schools that best conform and perform to the rankings criteria achieve high rankings and 
reap tremendous rewards” (2002: 110, our emphasis). Writing more generally about business entities, 
Martins argues that rankings "push organisations to change in accordance with the criteria used by the 
rankings…thus constraining organisational strategy to focus on an externally defined ideal of organisational 
performance" (2005: 715, our emphasis). 
Though valuable, we argue that these contributions fall short in capturing the different facets revealed by 
exploring the notion of reactivity. Current work tends to foreground one facet only: the arrival of a salient 
indicator that presents a template of what reality ought to be. If there is a discrepancy between the 
organisation and the measure, what typically follows is a shifting of the organisation towards the ranking. 
This view, however, portrays the organisational reaction to a ranking as something like a ‘reflex’ (Lynch 
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2000). We can depict this, following Lynch (2000), as ‘mechanical’ reactivity. The question however arises as 
to whether this simple kind of reactivity might be able to account for and explain more complex cases of the 
reflexive influence of rankings over organisations. How far, for example, does the notion apply in 
circumstances of multiple rankings? 
Reactive conformance is only one possible outcome 
We build our argument on the increasing evidence that actors and organisations do not always seek to 
conform to performance systems. In her discussion of early university business school rankings, for instance, 
Wedlin (2006) shows how some high prestige institutions could (at the outset at least) afford to ignore the 
introduction of new measure arising from outside the sector e.g. from newspapers like the Financial Times. 
Martins (2005: 715) similarly considers "[…] why some organisations capitulate to the institutional pressures 
exerted by rankings, whereas others resist them". Building on this argument, we propose that in giving 
attention to the initial introduction of a ranking, rather than its continuation or stabilisation, scholars have 
largely overlooked the possible range of alternative responses. These include the possibility that - as the 
organisation becomes more familiar with the ranking(s) - its response(s) may evolve, triggering a further 
course of decision-making or even resistance (Martins 2005). It is also not a great leap to suggest that, while 
an organisation may react through a narrow process of conformance to one or a few measures, when 
presented with a range of rankers, this may lead to the creation of more complex forms of 
reflexivity/reactivity.  
Recent work from the sociology of worth (Stark 2009) has argued that we need to understand the 
heterogeneity of the evaluative ‘ecosystem’ that has emerged in some areas, including the ‘productive 
friction' this creates. This school of thought foregrounds how there is seldom just one single principle of 
evaluation; rather, as the number of performance measures increase, multiple modes of evaluation will 
compete against one another (see also Chenhall, Hall and Smith 2013). Similarly, while not talking specifically 
about rankings, organisational scholars investigating corporate performance measurement systems have 
suggested that competing systems may push an organisation not towards alignment but ‘nonconformity' 
(Greenwood et al. 2011). Greenwood et al. (2011) argue that in the case of a plurality of social ordering 
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systems reflexivity is enhanced because organisations can ‘see' and are forced to ‘reflect' upon the different 
(and often contradictory) responses asked of them. This is potentially liberating for organisations, they 
argue, as it provides for greater discretion and room for manoeuvre (Stark 2009). It follows from this that to 
respond reflectively, organisations must begin to appreciate just how rankings may diverge and which of 
these differences may be important to them.  
How new experts help organisations respond to multiple rankings 
While there has been growing interest amongst accounting scholars and others in the expansion of rankings 
(Jeacle and Carter 2011, Scott and Orlikowski 2012, Pollock and D’Adderio 2012, Brandtner 2016), there has 
not been the same level of focus in how those ranked might respond to or manage the multiplicity challenge. 
In a few cases, scholars have started to note how the introduction of new experts may help organisations 
build their knowledge about the specifics of rankings in order to excel on them. These studies, however, 
diverge in their analysis of what these actors mean for the organisational response. Sauder and Fine (2008), 
for example, show that, to meet the informational demands of “thirty or forty rankings a year”, US business 
schools have turned to public relations (PR) professionals (ibid: 716). Described as ‘reputational 
entrepreneurs', these experts help schools improve their placings by ‘selecting', ‘synthesising' and 
‘simplifying' the information presented to rankers. Wedlin (2006) also notes the ‘dramatic' increase in 
business schools soliciting external PR advice. However, she theorises their presence as further evidence that 
schools are ‘adapting' to rankings, because, as she sees it, the role of PR experts is to gather and diffuse 
information about the criteria behind a ranking to encourage the kinds of compliance described above. 
These latter studies, therefore, point to the need for further analysis and theorisation of the potential ways 
in which new emergent categories of actors might mediate reactions. We can reasonably expect that some 
version of the selection, synthesis and simplifying process identified by Sauder and Fine (2008) to be 
significant in the presence of multiple rankings. As a corollary, we are also interested whether these experts 
might offer organisations a wider range of responses than merely facilitating simple conformance (as 
identified by Wedlin 2006). 
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Our research question is thus to understand how organisations reconfigure themselves to respond to 
multiple ranking. This includes analysing how they are building new kinds of expertise, the nature of 
interactions these experts form with rankers, and the opportunities these specialists present to ranked 
organisations.   
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS 
To address our research question, we focus on the ‘enterprise solution' area. Enterprise systems are large-
scale applications such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relations management (CRM) 
solutions. This sector provides vantage points to study the organisational response to many rankings 
because it has witnessed a significant increase in the number of rankers over the past few years. The 
proliferation of rankings in the enterprise solutions domain reflects the fact that these kinds of systems are 
notoriously difficult to evaluate and procure. Enterprise system acquisition suffers from ‘information 
impactedness' (Williamson 1975). This describes the situation whereby the buyer typically does not know 
the ‘value' of the software solution before purchasing and installing it, causing information asymmetries 
which may encourage opportunistic behaviour by the vendor. This feature has led to a rapid growth in the 
kinds and numbers of bodies attempting to help buyers through providing indicators of vendor products and 
performance. 
The main groups producing rankings in this area are known as ‘industry analysts'. Bernard and Gallupe 
(2013) have highlighted the diversity within what they call the ‘IT industry analyst sector'. This currently 
comprises: a handful of very large ranking organisations (notably ‘the Big Three’ of Gartner, Forrester and 
IDC); a modest number of smaller firms (such as Aberdeen, GigaOM, Ovum, Yankee Group, including various 
industry specialist organisations); and "hundreds of boutique firms" (very small organisations and 
individuals) (Dennington and Leforestier 2013: 6). These firms make their money through selling research to 
adopter organisations purchasing IT systems. Many have a ‘hybrid’ business model, selling information and 
services also to technology vendors. A distinction is often made between analyst firms that generate 
revenues from IT adopters (‘buy-side’) or IT vendors (‘sell-side’) (Tan 2014). 
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The number of rankings in this sector has continued to grow because of social media technologies which 
have lowered the barriers to entry (Bernard and Gallupe 2013). One industry database suggests a shift from 
around 100 industry analyst firms just a decade or two ago to something closer to 700 today.1 Our fieldwork 
investigations suggest there could be many as ‘50’ different landmark evaluations that IT vendors must 
consider. ‘Landmark evaluations’ is a term used by our vendor informants to signify those rankings that 
matter to them (e.g. have the potential to influence their customers). These typically, though not 
necessarily, include the rankings produced by the major buy-side analyst organisations like the ‘Gartner 
Magic Quadrant’, the ‘Forrester Wave’, and the ‘IDC MarketScape’ etc (see Figure 1).  
Two further aspects about these rankings merit note. First, each analyst organisation will produce many 
‘versions’ of their ranking targeted at different technologies, geographies, market segments etc. Gartner will 
produce approximately 230 different Magic Quadrants each year; Forrester nearly 150 of its Wave; and IDC a 
100 of its MarketScape. This markedly increases the number of rankings that large multi-product and multi-
geography vendors will have to confront (with some the largest IT vendors encountering up to 100 different 
rankings at any one time). Second, there is fierce competition between vendors just to ‘enter' these 
rankings. The bulk of rankings in this area – in contrast to the lists found in other fields - are ‘visual’. Visual 
devices foster particular dynamics (Busco and Quattrone 2015). For instance, our previous research has 
shown how industry analyst firms will limit the number of vendors that can be included in any one ranking 
(Author Study 2012). They seek to ensure that they are not ‘overcrowded’ or difficult for clients to read (thus 
the Magic Quadrant is limited to 25 vendors, the Market Scape to 15, and the Wave to 12). This means that 
this is a zero-sum situation where just making it onto one of these important rankings, never mind where the 
organisation is placed, can become a major task (ibid).  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 This is the ARchitect database maintained by ARInsights (http://www.arinsights.com). 
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Figure 1. Gartner’s Magic Quadrant ranking 
 
 
Data Collection 
Mapping the organisational response to industry analysts 
The highly diverse and fragmented landscape of the industry analyst sector provides vantage points to study 
how IT organisations respond to being exposed to multiple rankings. We note how ranked organisations 
have not stood still considering this new problem. One particular development is that they have created new 
forms of expertise to help them take a more systematic response to the challenge – the so-called ‘analyst 
relations' specialist approach (hereafter ‘AR’). The role of AR (or ‘influencer relations’ as they are also 
known) appears primarily to be about making sense of, interfacing with, and at times ‘confronting’ or 
‘countering’ industry analysts and other influential rankers.  
To study industry analysts and the recent emergence of AR specialists we needed to develop a data 
collection method which acknowledged the field’s highly complex and distributed nature. Our data collection 
methodology was therefore principally inductive but informed by a broad interest in recent trends in the 
shaping of rankings. Our preliminary analysis suggested the need to move away from the view that rankings 
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could be analysed separately from the organisational nexus in which they were shaped and used. Following 
this early insight, we have thus opted to study the development and use of these rankings in their combined 
production and usage setting. We found useful in this respect Sauder and Fine's (2008) conceptualisation of 
ranking bodies, not as part of a separate evaluative realm but embedded in an ‘interactional arena'. The idea 
of an interactional arena foregrounds how rankers find it necessary to operate in proximity to practice which 
provides the possibility not just of greater contact but also of sustained interaction. Although not explicitly 
developed in their paper, this suggested that, to understand the reflexive interactions between 
organisations and rankings, it was necessary to follow not just the production of these measures but the 
circuits through which they are distributed and consumed. Rather than take any one stakeholder as our unit 
of analysis, therefore, we focused on the continuous interactions between actors in what we later came to 
think of as the ‘ranking chain’. 
Investigating the ‘ranking chain’ 
We draw further inspiration for the term ranking chain from informants who had come to conceive of 
rankers according to their import in adding value to their organisations through supply chain notions like 
‘tiering' (‘tier 1 rankers', ‘tier 2 rankers', etc.). The field-inspired label of ‘ranking chain' helped focus our 
analysis on the various ‘service levels' (as informants called them) that were put into place to respond to the 
different category of ranker. It also pointed at the importance and configuration of ‘the logistics’ connected 
to these interactions. 
Studying interactions within and across the ranking chain (as opposed, for example, to studying the impact 
of a ranking on an organisation, the conventional research design for studying rankings) promised more 
valuable insights into the complexities of the ranking system, though capturing these connections posed 
methodological challenges. We encountered (at least) two difficulties. One immediate obstacle, also 
remarked on by Sauder & Fine (2008), was the impenetrability of these circuits. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 
participants in the ranking chain are reserved and reluctant to discuss the details of their work and dealings 
with rankers. This perhaps explains why there are so few studies of these kinds of exchanges since most 
remain concealed from public view. A further difficulty was that these interactions often take place in 
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temporary, liminal spaces at the interstices between organisations. Exchanges are typically widely dispersed, 
often mediated (through telephone, email or webinars) or taking place in transient settings (industry 
conferences or workshops). One had the feeling when conducting the ethnography of never being in the 
right place at the right time (Law 1994). This presented problems for traditional ethnographic research 
designs, which are typically enacted in particular moments and located in specific organisational settings 
(Marcus 1995). 
Strategic ethnography  
To help overcome this potential limitation we acknowledged Marcus' (1995) point of the need to be 
‘strategic' during ethnography to capture phenomena that overflow the single site. Our solution to dealing 
with this problem was to focus our attention on one set of actors and their interactions in what seemed to 
us to be both a key and available link in the ranking chain. This was the Institute for Industry Analyst 
Relations (IIAR), a member organisation formed over a decade ago by AR experts based in the UK, to bring 
together IT vendors responding to rankers. Currently representing approximately 60 of the largest IT vendors 
in the world, its aims are linked to a concerted effort to build and strengthen the fledgling AR community, to 
help these people act in unison, to create and share knowledge and expertise, etc. Towards these aims, the 
IIAR runs monthly meetings and webinars that bring together a wide selection of actors including the rankers 
themselves for discussions and informal meetings. We initially attended – and later, as our project’s 
stakeholder participation strategy evolved, helped in the organization of - these events. A key feature of 
these gatherings is that, because the IIAR does not have its own offices, and it leans on the support of its 
member organisations and others, is that these meetings are held in different locations each time – including 
the offices of the rankers. Strategic choices in research design should be coupled, as Marcus (ibid) argues, 
with opportunism in exploiting avenues of access. In this respect, we could make use of visits to these 
different actors in the ranking chain as part of our data collection. 
Data gathering 
The data collection for the study comprised ethnography and in-depth semi-structured interviews in the 
context of AR. We conducted approximately 300 hours of physical observation of meetings and participated 
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in a further 50 related conference calls or webinars. We have also carried out over 60 interviews with actors 
working both in ranker and ranked organisations.  
The focus of our ethnography was the IIAR. Initially, the first author's participation in IIAR activities was as a 
researcher simply there to take notes. He also gave talks on his research (on industry analysts), and together 
with other IIAR members, co-authored several IIAR ‘white papers’ and blog posts. This included co-designing 
and publishing an IIAR ‘ranking of the rankers’ (see below). As the various participants in the ranking chain 
got to know and trust him, he became more involved in the running and governance of the IIAR (eventually 
being invited to stand for election to the board, which give him unfettered access to the more private IIAR 
meetings). Overall, participant-observation helped us gain first-hand experience in the challenges involved in 
responding to rankings. Many of the activities and interactions described below, while routine for the 
organisations involved, are unknown to social scientists interested in performance information of this kind. 
This meant that the ethnography helped illuminate the complex chain of players, the intricacy of the 
influence creation and reception process, as well as the convoluted relations at play. 
Our study is further informed and contextualised by interviews and discussions conducted with respondents 
distributed across different locations. We have conducted over 20 semi-structured interviews and carried 
out many more hours of informal conversations with AR experts (located either within vendors or working in 
PR firms or independent agencies). Discussions lasted between 1-2 hours (and some were re-interviewed 
several times). Also, we could consult archived recordings of meetings stored in the IIAR repository that 
stretched back several years. The repository also included presentations, IIAR policy documents, and notes 
on best practice in conducting AR. Finally, our fieldwork also engaged with the rankers themselves. We have 
formally interviewed more than 40 current or ex-analysts about how they construct Magic Quadrants, 
Forrester Waves, MarketScapes etc. While many of these analysts work for the leading industry analyst firms 
Gartner, Forrester and IDC, we also sought out those employed in smaller, competitor firms or in the new 
‘upstart’ analyst firms. See Table 1 for a list of data sources referred to in the text.  
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Table 1. Data sources referred to in text 
Initials Works for Method How evidence collected 
SL AR Agency (ex-
industry analyst) 
Multiple 
interviews/observations from 
2013-16 
Some recorded/mostly 
notes 
TR Industry Analyst firm Telephone interview 25th 
August 2015 
Recorded 
CL AR Agency (ex-
industry analyst) 
Webinar 5th Oct 2009 Recorded 
JB PR firm Interview 20th Oct 2009 Recorded 
DC AR Agency (ex-
industry analyst) 
Interviews/multiple 
observations from 2013-16 
Some recorded/mostly 
notes 
AH IT Vendor Interview 1st Oct 2015 Notes 
EM AR Agency Interview 18th Sept 2014 Recorded 
LL IT Vendor Multiple interviews/ 
observations from 2013-16 
Some recorded/mostly 
notes 
NWD Industry Analyst firm Interview 20th Oct 2009 Recorded 
DM Industry Analyst firm Interview 19th Mar 2010 Recorded 
 
Data Analysis 
This rich body of data was inductively analysed according to the principles of grounded theorising (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967, Eisenhardt 1989) and successively compared with insights from the literature. The data 
analysis process, which was carried out by the first author and verified by the second, began during our 
ethnography where he wrote notes on each interview and observation period and coded the accumulating 
interviews and observation material based on in vivo phrases and terms as mentioned by informants (Van 
Maanen 1989). This included scouring field notes and transcripts and the material contained in the IIAR 
online repository (Ryan and Bernard 2003). The goal was to get close to the daily practices of AR experts by 
examining what they did to foster interactions with rankers. Recurring themes in the data included 
categories such as ‘inquiries’, ‘constant touches’, ‘briefings’, ‘logistics’, ‘expertise’, ‘occupation’, ‘valorisation’ 
‘influence’, etc. Particular attention was given to indigenous categories like ‘tiering strategy’, ‘SAS days’, 
‘service levels’, ‘the onion’, ‘ranking the rankers’, ‘moving the dot activities’ etc.  
In the second phase of coding, these in vivo entries were further compared to develop a sense of the 
variation within them and to foreground emerging concepts and their interrelationships. At this stage, we 
also evolved the emergent categories by comparing our data with existing theoretical frameworks. This 
allowed us to collapse some of the in vivo categories into a set of second-order notions. This included 
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identifying a range of techniques whereby those ranked began: to foster specialised skills and expertise with 
regard to rankings; to work to create increasing interactions and involvement with rankers; to comprehend 
and map the varying levels of influence of particular rankers/rankings; and, to create new distinctions 
between rankers.  
As the links and interrelations between second-order categories became clearer, we were able to synthesise 
these into larger groupings which cast our insights at a more abstract level (Ryan and Bernard 2003). This 
more logically ordered set of categories thus obtained focused on how organisations react to multiple 
rankings through the complementary mechanisms of navigating and (re)negotiating (see Table 2 for final 
coding structure). This finally led to identifying as our overarching theme the strategies organisations 
develop to respond to rankings by conforming and/or transforming. After selecting this final theme, we 
continued to discuss it with informants to validate our reading of the situation, which included sending them 
drafts of the paper and making changes based on their feedback.  
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Table 2: Final coding structure 
First order  Second order  Overarching theme 
“we did inquiries”, “I need to do briefings”, ‘SAS 
days’, “doing references”, “get the best coverage”, 
a “mountain of stuff”, “we’re pre-filter”, “don’t 
give me lots of marketing”, “a good opinion”, 
“right messages”, to “positively influence thinking” 
 
 
Fostering 
specialisation 
within the 
organisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How organisations react to multiple 
rankings through complementary 
practices of navigation and (re) 
negotiation 
“We’re friends”, “constant touches”, “building the 
relationship”, “deep dives”, “speak with that 
analyst over a meal and try to convey to them our 
thought leadership”, “how am I going to work with 
these analysts” 
 
Creating greater 
involvement 
between ranker 
and ranked 
“tiering strategy”, “service levels”, “it’s like layers 
of an onion, who’s in the middle, who’s the next 
layer and the next layer”, “focus our time”, 
“different levels of importance”, “who’s most 
influential for you”, “the person in the middle of 
the onion”, “under-allocating efforts on influential 
analysts”, “most analysts relations effort is 
wasted”,  “a lack of understanding” 
 
Comprehending 
and mapping 
influence 
 “So IDC I put very much ‘The challenger’”, “a lot of 
the analyst relations function having a tiering 
system”, “the front row was reserved for Gartner”, 
“to develop a common picture of which analysts 
were reporting [on] them and how they were seen 
by analysts”, “we started to be more systematic 
about collecting it” 
 
Creating new 
distinctions 
 
FINDINGS 
Our results capture and theorise the techniques created by organisations to enact sophisticated responses to 
multiple rankings. We find that organisations do not simply react to industry rankings in isolation. They 
instead develop internally by creating capacities and forms of calculative expertise (Tan 2014) which help to 
address the complexities associated with the coexistence of multiple rankings. The new kind of expertise 
consists in the development of a novel professional category, that of the AR specialist. These kinds of 
specialist emerging within the industry nexus have acquired the knowledge and techniques needed to 
understand the structure, dynamics and methods of the industry analyst sector and to help technology 
vendors make choices about how to select between and respond to rankings.  
DEVELOPING NEW TECHNIQUES 
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Our findings highlight how the work of AR involves developing a range of techniques that support the 
processes of selection and reaction to rankings. We start by describing some of the main mechanisms they 
deploy to do this work.  
Fostering a more proactive approach 
A major way in which AR specialists shape the organisational response is by managing the material 
conditions surrounding rankings – what our experts refer to as ‘the logistics’. Part of the logistics is to foster 
a more pro-active approach. One informant explains how, vendor staff “will come to us and say: ‘We’re in 
this particular Magic Quadrant’, and we want to make sure that we get the best coverage in the one that’s 
coming up as possible” (interview, SL). Preparing for an assessment typically starts several months ahead of 
a ranking submission deadline. It will involve not one person but a whole team of individuals from across the 
organisation, who will together produce a report that will extend over 50 pages. However, there is much 
more to the logistics than simply filling out forms. As well as gathering the information, the AR specialist may 
have to help prepare it for presentation or sometimes even present it to the analyst firm:  
Analyst relations professionals rarely brief the analysts themselves. I've always done it, but I'm 
probably more technical than most, so it depends on the seniority. So for [recent example] we had 
loads of AR people who were ex-product managers, so they know their stuff really well. What AR 
people would do is they would teach the subject to an analyst. I tend to brief the analysts on high-
level stuff, you know, ‘who’s the company?’ and those kind of things (interview, LL).  
As one informant told us, this is not just a matter of presenting the data to the industry analyst; it is also a 
question of understanding the analysts’ perspectives and giving the information to them in a way they will 
understand. Vendors face difficulties in presenting the qualities of their new offerings to industry analysts 
and other opinion shapers. These problems may be particularly acute where a product differs significantly 
from established market understandings or categories, in terms perhaps of its technical features or of the 
business challenges that it addresses. The AR specialists we spoke to observed that those involved in product 
development tend to highlight technical features and have more difficulty conveying the business case for a 
new product:  
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They talked about everything they did in very much a technical way. But if you look through all of 
their Gartner research, for example, that came out about them, they said, no, you need to be talking 
about things in a very much business problem point of view. It is not rocket science. But they were 
still coming from a technical point of view (interview, JB). 
This is where the AR specialist comes in. As one says: “…we act like the analysts, like a pre-filter. We say [to 
the product development people] give us the information. We will tell you what information to give us. Do 
not give us any of that stuff. Don’t waste time on any of that because it’s a complete waste of time” 
(interview, SL). Here AR specialists draw on their understanding and often direct experience of the culture 
and practices of industry analyst firms to achieve what Garfinkel (1967) called ‘recipient design’. This is 
where an actor constructs their message in a way that will increase the likelihood that it is understood and 
acted upon. One informant, who was a Gartner analyst before turning to AR, describes the typical analyst 
workload and how this, therefore, affects how he crafts his message. This means that if the AR specialist is 
not clear with the information they provide to the analyst: 
…the analyst may never even notice it. They’ll never hear the fact that we’re hugely differentiated 
because we do this. At the time I mentioned it, they were reading their email or somebody has just 
called them from across the office, I’ve no idea, I’m on the phone with them, I think they’re looking 
at my slide and listening to me; they’re not (interview, SL). 
AR specialists achieve this form of understanding not through episodic contact with analysts but sustained 
interaction. The work of AR appears primarily concerned with maintaining and exploiting informal channels 
within the ranking bodies to create the space and occasion for collaboration. 
Developing greater interactions with rankers  
Personal familiarity and networking appear a dominant resource in this community (Simakova 2012). Unlike 
most other kinds of assessment – where there is typically a formal separation between ranker and ranked 
(Free, Salterio and Shearer 2009) – analysts and AR seem to forge particularly close relations. Many of these 
people will be interacting with and talking to each other on a regular almost weekly basis either through 
‘vendor briefings’ (a formal ‘pitch’ made to analysts about new products/services) or more informally over 
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lunch or at an event or conference. Moreover, many of the technology vendors will be ‘clients’ of the 
industry analysts. This not only provides them with access to their research but also to formally contracted 
meetings with the analysts themselves, such as ‘inquiries’ (which are one-to-one calls made to an analyst).2 
Finally, some of these people will even socialise together in the evening, and it is not unheard of for them to 
refer to each other as ‘friends'. 
We discover that AR specialist have borrowed (from the allied field of marketing) a lexicon to describe the 
various types of interactions that could go on between them and analysts and others. In a professional 
development webinar, the founder of an AR agency, describes how his engagement with analysts proceeds 
through ‘touches’ (in line with the established marketing principle that it takes 7 or 8 ‘touches’ before 
someone will internalize and/or act upon your call to action): 
I need to do ‘briefings’; I need to do ‘deep dives’; I need to perhaps do a ‘SAS day’; I’m going to work 
on social media; I’m going to actually have ‘social time’ with my executive; speak with that analyst 
over a meal and try to convey to them our thought leadership. So those are ‘the touches’ (webinar, 
CL).3   
These meetings play several roles that help the AR specialist plan their response. They provide information 
about ‘who’ is involved. Preparation for a ranking should start by identifying those analysts responsible for 
collecting and compiling the assessment information: 
…remember some of these Magic Quadrants may have a lead analyst, and then have additional 
researching-type analysts that are working to get the information. You need to know who is actually 
in charge, and who is actually doing the data gathering, and what are the characteristics of these 
analysts? Are they approachable? Are they people whom we have a strong relationship with? And 
exactly how am I going to work with these analysts? (webinar, CL).   
                                                     
2 The fact that rankers will often be evaluating their customers raises many of the same issues concerning 
‘independence' that one finds with auditors who are assessing their clients (see Sikka [2009] on auditor independence).  
3 An ‘SAS day’ – Strategic Advisory Service day – is where Gartner clients can ask Gartner analysts for detailed advice on 
their go to market and product development strategies, amongst other things.  
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The interactions allow the compilation not merely lists of analysts but more detailed ‘profiles’. These 
sketches – some noted in a jotter, others added to specially developed software packages – might be 
collected over a period of months and even years. We had access to some of these, and they would describe 
in detail the analyst's career, their knowledge of the vendor, as well as, importantly, their inclination or 
attitude towards the ranked organisation: 
[Bob] is IDC’s new lead analyst for [vendor]. He joined IDC about 6 months ago and this is his first 
analyst position. As lead analyst, he is in a position to influence all research at IDC that prominently 
features [vendor]. [Bob’s] overall position on [vendor] is positive...He recently was briefed by 
[vendor employee] on our M&A strategy and was quoted publicly reinforcing our messages (vendor 
document).  
Given the myriad of different rankers commenting on and assessing vendor products, however, the key 
problem in this role was to find the rankers who would count or make a difference in a product or service 
area. This required a substantial effort to estimate the influence of a ranking either in absolute terms or 
relative to others.  
Tiering  
A third way in which AR specialists shape responses to rankings is by helping assess the rankers’ influence. 
Working out which are the important rankers for your organisation is one requirement. Getting to the right 
people within the ranker seems to be another. There are significant differences in terms of influence 
between the various analyst firms in the sector. It is not necessarily the case that all ‘landmark’ rankings are 
automatically important to an organisation. Some are more important than others. Likewise, identifying the 
most influential analyst expertise was complicated by the fact that there were also significant differences 
within these firms regarding the influence wielded by individuals. This is a domain characterised by what are 
called ‘star analysts' (people reputed for their technical knowledge who would often also possess charismatic 
personal attributes) (Wang 2010). Thus, a key aspect of the work of AR experts appears concerned with the 
creation of lists that sort and prioritise rankers and individuals according to their perceived importance and 
influence – which underpin their so-called ‘tiering strategies’.  
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We were interested in the different ‘calculative practices’ (Miller 2001) that have emerged in recent years 
amongst these groups. During fieldwork, we found two distinctive (and in some respects competing) ways of 
assessing influence. The first, a ‘social interaction’ model, is where the AR expert fosters interactions with 
analysts to build up a rich picture of their reach and sway (as described in the section above). The second, 
more ‘quantitatively’ focused, was heavily reliant on the use of new social media technologies and online 
influence measurement tools. These generated an automatic score based on a variety of criteria related to 
the popularity of a ranking (e.g. the number of times a ranking is mentioned or shared across various social 
media platforms [Gerlitz and Lury 2014]). On AR specialist told us, “I understand the whole tiering better 
than anyone else, especially when it comes to social media, because I have developed tools that can do that, 
that no one else has got (interview, JB). There appeared to be an almost ‘disciplinary’ divergence between 
those that looked to exploit the affordances of ‘big data’ to measure a ranking’s influence and others, critical 
of this turn towards quantitative information, who argued for the benefits of more qualitative practices. 
Once in place, these tiering strategies would structure the organisation's responses to a ranking. The role of 
tiering was to open opportunities for the organisation beyond responding in a mechanistic and unreflexive 
manner, either by reacting immediately to the first ranking that came along or by treating all rankers in the 
same way. One AR specialist told us, “when analyst relations are done badly, it is done in a very reactive 
manner (interview, JB). Another writes, “[i]t's easy to get very reactive, very quickly as unchecked content 
races rampant across the Internet" (IIAR internal document). Additional informants told us how, "if you are 
working consistently in analyst relations and you're treating each analyst the same then either you have 
unlimited resources and a very low level of sophistication, or you're wasting effort" (interview, DC). 
Most AR teams we talked to seemed to work with a basic ‘three-tiered' system of differentiation, paying 
more attention to ‘tier one' and less to those they considered ‘tier two' or ‘tier three'. In practice, this would 
mean that when they had to get news or information out, the tiering strategy would dictate whom they 
speak to and how much effort they put into it: "We have to focus our time. If we have got someone 
important to get a message to, are we going to test it with everyone? No. We pick up the three best people 
because we have only got three hours, to speak to. So, our job is always to make sure which of the people 
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are important" (interview, JB). Likewise, when an analyst contacts a vendor to ask them to talk to executives 
or for the latest product strategy - because either they are compiling a ranking or perhaps one of their own 
clients has asked them for information about a specific vendor offering – there will be differing ‘service 
levels’ at play based on their perceived importance (interview, DC)  
One informant likened the identification of these layers of influence to ‘peeling an onion’: “Of course you 
want to identify who’s most influential for you. It’s like layers of an onion, who’s in the middle, who’s the 
next layer and the next layer, you concentrate most importantly on the people in the centre and then less 
and less on the people around” (interview, SL). However, in this dynamic space, the added complication is 
that it is not always the analyst at the centre of the onion that turns out to be the one wielding influence. 
Influence can move around as our informant goes on to describe: 
…lets say you're a specialist [analyst] in mobile application development…You're the most important 
analyst to me, but you're pretty busy, and there's an event coming up…You're not going to speak at 
it but [another analyst] is….I'm a delegate at that conference, I want to talk to someone about 
mobile application development, you're not there, he's there…He's not the person in the middle of 
the onion, but at that point in time, he's critically important to the vendor because if that user now 
asks him who should I buy and he doesn't mention that vendor, there's an opportunity gone for 
them (interview, SL). 
Keeping up with just which ranker might be able to wield influence over your organisation’s market segment 
is the most difficult task in the AR role. Some we talked to, especially those who were new to the AR role, or 
where this was just one element of what they did, confessed how they found maintaining and updating the 
tiering strategy overwhelming (interview, AH). Many have turned to external specialists who are providing 
new kinds of performance information – so-called ‘rankings of the rankers'. 
Ranking the Rankers 
A fourth mechanism used by AR specialists is to turn some of the tools the rankers apply to them and their 
organisations back onto the rankers themselves. Several new players have emerged - independent AR 
‘agencies’ and ‘consultancies’ – to produce and sell ‘rankings of the rankers’. Initially, the products and 
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services sold by these agencies involved simply collating information about rankings, but this was 
subsequently extended through the production of guides and practitioner handbooks, and the running of 
seminars and workshops. Today, some sell advanced forms of the tiering strategy discussed above.  
We interviewed the founder of one of the first of these agencies, who was responsible for producing the 
‘analyst quotations database’ which went on to become one of the most popular resources for information 
about analysts, and a source of inspiration for other AR specialists attempting to create similar rankings. He 
talks us through how the database was started: 
I was sitting in the American Airlines lounge at O’Hare airport one day, waiting for a flight, and I 
picked up a copy of…PC World…And as I leafed through it, I saw that there were several places 
where analysts were quoted. So, I opened up Excel just as a personal record so I could remember 
which analyst said what about which firms. I started making a spreadsheet that had some of these 
analysts’ quotations, name of the analyst, name of the company, name of the publication, date of 
the publication and a little bit about what the analyst said, nothing fancy - just a spreadsheet 
(interview, EM). 
Later, he shared the spreadsheet with his agency colleagues who agreed it looked interesting. They created 
reports that differentiated and rated industry analysts from the original spreadsheet and started using that 
data in discussions with clients. Because customers were enthusiastic about it, they began to be more 
systematic about collecting the data. Once they had enough information, as explained by our informant, “we 
tried to interest some clients into subscribing to a report, and some of them did, so that was when we 
started the report” (interview, EM). 
In constructing these rankings, it was intriguing to see how these groups drew explicitly on tools and 
presentation formats that industry analysts had developed to rate vendors and their products. An AR 
specialist told us of where he had got the idea for his ranking: “I bastardised Gartner’s and Forrester’s own 
methodology against them. So [showing the first author an example] this is the Gartner Magic Quadrant of 
Analyst Houses, and this is the Forrester Wave of Analysts. And this would show which of the analysts had 
the greatest influence” (interview, JB). These new rankings were at the outset a ‘bit of fun’, and circulated 
26 
 
internally within the AR community. Later, some began to be posted on websites to increase traffic. Today, 
in some cases, they have come to take on a growing importance (and in some cases, are developed as a 
central part of the value proposition provided by the agencies).  
How rankings of the rankers create new distinctions  
A final practice used by AR specialists to assist the response to rankings consists in helping create practical 
distinctions between rankers. AR experts seek to differentiate industry analysts primarily regarding the 
influence they wield over technology adopters. We investigated the ‘KCG Mystical Box Chart’ which is one of 
the most widely diffused rankings of rankers (see Figure 2). KCG seek to differentiate and rank industry 
analysts primarily in terms of their ‘influence over’ enterprise technology buyers and ‘exposure in’ the IT 
product market (Hopkins and England 2012). They position analyst firms on a two-by-two matrix that closely 
resembles Gartner’s Magic Quadrant. They name this (with delicious irony) the KCG Mystical Box Chart. Like 
the Magic Quadrant before it, this tool sorts industry analysis into four quadrants and then positions them 
along two dimensions: influence and exposure. A salient feature is the classification and ranking by AR 
experts of industry analyst organisations in terms of their (direct) adopter and (indirect) media influence. 
Rankers are positioned as either Deal Makers or Breakers (because of their influence over procurement 
choices), Point Players (where they have high levels of specific competence), Talking Heads (who enjoy high 
levels of exposure in the media), and Wannabees and Consultants (who have limited direct influence on the 
market).  
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Figure 2. KCG (Knowledge Capital Group) Mystical Box Chart 
 
Source: The Knowledge Capital Group (reprinted with permission) 
 
These often seemingly humorous interventions are far from trivial. We saw numerous examples of how 
these distinctions could pattern the interactions between the ranked organisations and the rankers – often 
acting as a filter. The rankers themselves told us how they recognised they were being countered by the 
ranked organisations in this way. For some, it seemed just a further evolution in their dealings with IT 
vendors: “You see a lot of the analyst relations function having a tiering system - i.e. saying that we are 
predominately dealing with Gartner and the Magic Quadrant world, little bit of Forrester if you have 
time…then the rest of the world” (interview, TR). These distinctions, in this analyst’s view, were creating an 
evident and crude hierarchy that privileged one set of rankers over others regardless of expertise or 
relevance. Whereas in the past they were mostly implicit, today they have taken on a quite public and 
(according to some) intrusive aspect of relationships. One analyst recalled the striking example of how at a 
recent briefing these distinctions were used to determine the layout of the room: 
There are times I get exasperated with people who almost tier blindly…one provider who shall 
remain nameless, at a briefing…typically, it is quite a relaxed, informal meeting and you know the 
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drill for the briefings… All the front row had name tags for the briefing, which is unusual anyway, but 
not only nametags, but all the front row was reserved for Gartner, even analysts who don't cover the 
vendor (interview, TR). 
Others, however, complained that the rankings of the rankers meant that suppliers were now choosing to 
deal only with a handful of the industry analyst firms (even to the extent of prioritising those who did not 
research the particular vendor/technology). For those rankers perceived as less influential, this was making 
their life a lot harder (rankers require good, unfettered access to the vendor to produce the reports they sell 
to their clients – but these strategies were beginning to change that).  
How these experts change the way organisations respond to rankings 
In previous sections, we have highlighted the new techniques enacted by AR specialists to articulate the 
organisation’s response to rankings. We now proceed to address how these techniques enabled 
organisations to choose between a range of possible responses that includes navigating and (re)negotiating. 
Navigating between rankings 
Most organisations in this area no longer approach all the rankers that cover their products in the same way. 
They navigate towards some and navigate away from others. Certain rankings have become obligatory 
points of passage that need to be considered. An informant describes how the Magic Quadrant is one such 
landmark ranking: 
For companies who are on the periphery of [Magic Quadrants], they make a huge difference to 
whether they get on to [customer procurement] shortlists and whether they have a chance to win a 
piece of business. So, if you’re not on, it’s far less likely that you’ll get shortlisted. If you are on [and] 
the further up to the right you are [on the ranking] the more likely you’ll get shortlisted and the 
more likely you’re going to win the business. So, everyone wants to get in, and everyone wants to 
move up to the right (interview, SL). 
In cases where rankings were crucial for getting onto adopter shortlists, for instance, then one possible 
response was conformance. Vendors told us that, because certain rankings had leverage amongst their client 
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base, it was here they would focus all their attention. This included, if necessary, adjusting aspects of what 
they did to align more closely with the ranking criteria (personal communication, AH). Ranked organisations, 
however, were also able to identify which rankers were less important to them, or were reputed to be 
difficult to work with, and thus might need to be navigated away from. For instance, a vendor might attempt 
to avoid a major ranker hostile to its organisation or committed to a different view of how the technology 
field should develop. An informant describes how: 
…there is a bit of a duopoly in this space: Gartner and Forrester. A lot of the vendors…like that 
duopoly as long as Gartner and Forrester like what they are doing. But…if the vendor [feels] they just 
don’t understand me, or fundamentally they just can’t get on those guys’ radar, because they are 
not seen as interesting or whatever, or, maybe, for genuine reasons, Gartner and Forrester…don’t 
really agree with what they are doing. It is various easy for those vendors to feel excluded 
(interview, WD). 
It is easy for a vendor to disagree with or be invisible to a ranker. The rankers view the world through their 
own ‘taxonomy’ (e.g. classification schemes). An informant explains how, “[b]ecause Gartner and all the 
technology houses see the world according to their own ‘taxonomy’, what do we do when we don’t fit into 
that taxonomy?” (interview, JB). Some organisations may attempt to find rankers more sympathetic to their 
view (see below). Others may decide it is too damaging to be excluded from a landmark evaluation and may 
look to reposition themselves within the taxonomy or, as we shown now, even attempt to change that 
taxonomy.  
Negotiating the shape of rankings 
Attempting to negotiate the form of a ranking was another potential response. Negotiating a measure could 
occur at different levels. One is to negotiate the ranker's perception of an organisation. It was common, for 
instance, when excluded from a ranking, to attempt to negotiate entry. As described by one informant: “In 
that case [not being included] we have to work with education to try and get things to change. And it is 
hard” (interview, JB). To evidence this latter point, he gives an example of the kinds of interactions he had 
with the ranker when the organisation he worked for was omitted: “…we tried to understand what the 
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analyst thought about our company, and we realised that there were several areas where there was a gap. 
So we made sure we filled those gaps…" (interview, JB). Regarding how these gaps were filled, he describes 
how: 
We did inquiries to understand whether what we believed the message should have [been, was] got 
across…and if it wasn't, we tried to fill that gap. So when the Magic Quadrant finally came out, we 
positioned! We knew the analyst had sufficient information, we knew where we had weak points 
and we addressed those, so it wasn't a shock. In fact, we were positioned in the top right-hand 
corner. It was fantastic (interview, JB). 
A further form of influence could be to negotiate the ranker’s conception of the technology. The same 
informant described the notable example where they could encourage Gartner to create a wholly new Magic 
Quadrant ranking for what they believed to be a developing innovation area. Gartner currently represented 
the technology with a Market Scope.4 From his previous discussions with analysts, our informant understood 
Gartner's internal processes for creating such a ranking. This includes establishing that there is a market with 
enough players for Gartner's work of assessment to be pertinent to its clients. He also liaised with other 
vendors to ensure that they would be able to meet other requisite criteria - in particular, Gartner's 
requirements regarding number of vendors and revenue volumes: 
We knew that for it to become a Magic Quadrant in its own right it had to have a certain amount of 
revenue within it, it had to have a certain number of vendors competing within it, lots of different 
scenarios. So we made sure that we actually had all these facts to hand, and say: ‘Look, this is not a 
Market Scope, it is a [Magic] Quadrant. It is this part of the technology cycle’. And it worked! They 
actually developed a new way of looking at things (interview, JB). 
To be involved in the creation of a new version of a Magic Quadrant was highly advantageous for a vendor 
(as it gave them the potential to dominate the ranking). Another - albeit more ambitious - possibility was to 
negotiate the analysts’ understanding of the wider market segment. We attended webinars, for instance, 
                                                     
4 A Market Scope was one of Gartner's lesser-known rankings designed to offer clients advice about emerging product 
areas where there were few players and a successful or dominant technology model had not yet been established, and 
where it was therefore not yet possible to draw a Magic Quadrant. 
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where it was suggested that the way to position well in a ranking was through creating an entirely new 
market category. A seasoned AR expert tells his audience: “You can own a market if you redefine the 
category, so you're the leader" (webinar, CL). While the speaker emphasises the considerable work required 
to negotiate this kind of change, he also flags the substantial rewards: 
Although it’s difficult, sometimes you might want to put yourself into a unique category. We call this 
‘category creation’. Category creation is particularly difficult to do, but particularly positive in terms 
of its overall response. It gives you the opportunity to create a new space where the buyer 
understands the product and the technology, there’s no confusion about exactly what the space is, 
you’re unique in this category, everybody else is an also-ran, and you’re going to be the leader 
(webinar, CL).  
We came across several attempts at category creating during our fieldwork. For instance, one AR specialist 
(JB) told us he had played a role in the early definition of the ‘Web Services’ category. However, it does not 
seem to be the case that AR players can easily or directly exert influence or control over analysts. It was 
more that they could negotiate the dynamics of influence. As one informant modestly observes, when he did 
manage to introduce a new category, “I must admit that I had help from some hefty vendors behind me who 
were trying to push it, so it wasn’t all thanks to me, but there was part of the process of trying to say: ‘No, 
this is what we need to do to make sure that Gartner recognise this as an area’” (interview, JB). 
(Re)negotiating the ecosystem 
A final mechanism observed involved attempts at renegotiating the wider ranking ecosystem. During our 
fieldwork, we saw how ranked organisations were becoming increasingly interested in the internal workings 
of rankers themselves. This went beyond simply collecting information about their assessment criteria to 
developing understandings of their business models and the competitive structure of the industry analyst 
sector: “Understand the analyst marketplace” was a typical heading on PowerPoint presentations in AR 
meetings (fieldwork document). “What is the analyst firm’s business model?” was another frequent question 
(webinar, SG). “You need to know how these firms generate revenue” (webinar, SG), was an additional piece 
of advice.  
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Some went further still. As noted earlier, there has been a marked increase in the number of analyst firms in 
the last few years (Bernard and Gallupe 2013). An important stimulus for this growth has been the IT 
vendors themselves who sought to encourage and sustain the presence of more rankers. In one informant’s 
words, “… a mature AR function also grows analyst firms” (personal communication, LL). What he is 
describing here is how some (very large) vendors sought to foster the growth of more ‘start up’ rankers. 
They would do this by commissioning research from them. An industry analyst, reflecting on the growth of 
these smaller sell-side players and their reliance on the large vendors, notes how: 
If IBM analysts stop funding analyst firms, which ones go bust? IBM has a very, very large analyst 
relations team; it is over 80 people worldwide, and they put millions of dollars into it every year. A 
lot of the smaller [analyst] firms live off the side of IBM, or IBM and a couple of other firms 
(interview, DM). 
A vendor might look to grow the number of rankers because this might give it more room for manoeuvre. 
For instance, a supplier excluded from a market by a ranker committed to a different view of how a 
technology field should develop, could find a more dynamic ecosystem advantageous. As an informant 
describes:  
It is very easy for…vendors to feel excluded [by established analysts like Gartner and Forrester]. That 
is why they like the idea of lots of these small players...it allows them to have a channel into that 
whole market even when the big [ranking firms] aren’t…amplifying the right kind of messages…So 
lots of choice in the analysts’ ecosystem is a good thing for some of the vendors (interview, WD). 
These specialists found that the number and difference between rankings meant that they needed to be 
understood as an ‘ecosystem’. There appeared to be a growing consensus in this area that the vendor 
community would be better served through growing the ecosystem. Fed up with being ignored or treated 
poorly by the large rankers some vendors found common interest in having a broad range of rankers. We 
even attended meetings where AR specialists - because they had developed a comprehensive knowledge of 
the analyst business model - would end up advising rankers on how to compete more efficiently against the 
dominant ranking firms like Gartner. An ecosystem of big and small players that were fulfilling different roles 
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allowed them to pilot towards those more aligned to their concerns and away from those that might be 
more critical.  
To summarise, what our story shows is that ranked organisations are now able to exercise a degree of 
‘choice' when responding to multiple rankings. Our investigations also suggest that the capacity and success 
of ranked organisation's AR teams in doing so were unevenly distributed. The latter examples, such as 
creating a new version of a ranking or helping to foster more analyst firms, required higher levels of 
experience, deeper knowledge of the workings of industry analysts, and significant internal budgets for 
research and marketing. Whereas attempts to relocate a vendor within a ranking were common, convincing 
a ranker of the emergence of a new market category was not. Likewise, sustaining and creating new ranking 
organisations was a tactic discussed only by one or two (of the very largest) IT vendors. Exercising such a 
choice depends on the level of resources they can deploy to such ends and whether such an investment 
would appear justifiable and doable. 
DISCUSSION 
The auditing of performance (Strathern 1997) is increasingly based on rankings (Shore and Wright 2015). The 
proliferation of these measures across the economy and society raises an interesting question for scholars of 
accounting, namely how organisation respond to such rankings. It is commonly assumed by those inside and 
outside accounting that actors respond to the pressure of rankings through reorienting towards them 
(Korberger and Carter 2010, Scott and Orlikowski 2012, Shore and Wright 2015). This conceptualisation 
worked well enough when one or a few similar rankings dominated a field, but falls short when there are 
multiple systems for measuring, ranking and auditing performance that differ regarding both influence and 
position in the field. We highlight this issue by considering how the continued proliferation of rankings forces 
us to revisit underlying assumptions about ‘reactivity’ (Espeland and Sauder 2007) and ‘reflexivity’ (Strathern 
1997). Whilst the idea of reactivity helps us understand how reflexivity is a fundamental characteristic of 
performance information e.g. that rankings both create expectations about performance and then 
encourage actors to realise those assumptions, it is less clear what kind of a response is provoked in the 
presence of more plural performance measurement systems (Greenwood et al., 2011). 
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Through analysing ethnographic material, and bringing together themes from accounting with those of 
organisational studies (Greenwood et al., 2011) and the ‘sociology of worth' (Stark 2009), we have examined 
how different organisations respond to the problem of multiple rankings. A key insight from our study is that 
organisations no longer simply align with in order to conform to a dominant measure but are instead 
‘transformed’ by them. To help show how these transformative dynamics differ from (but also build on) 
previous conceptions, we propose an analytical template that we call ‘reflexive transformation’. In doing so 
we extend Sauder and Fine (2008) through showing how ranked organisations foster specialisation, build 
connections, map influence and create distinctions. This template (illustrated in Figure 3) specifically allows 
us to show how the organisational response has shifted from a defensive to a more ‘proactive’ reaction 
(Wedlin 2006, Mennicken 2010). 
Figure 3. Reflexive transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflexive transformation 
We have identified the specific techniques which organisations enact to coordinate their response to 
multiple rankings. It is important to articulate how these findings relate to previous work. 
Our interest in fostering specialisation builds on a growing interest in the construction of new forms of 
‘calculative expertise’ (see Tan 2014) surrounding or responding to performance information. That ranked 
organisations will draw on external expertise to help them to excel on rankings has been noted but not yet 
Mapping influence 
Building distinctions 
Fostering specialisation 
Creating interactions 
Navigating  (Re)Negotiation 
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sufficiently developed within the literature (Wedlin 2006, Sauder and Fine 2009). We thus advance this 
further through showing how there has been a process of specialisation within ranked organisations as they 
nurture a new occupational category - the ‘analyst relations’ or ‘influencer relations’ role. These actors have 
constituted themselves as experts in helping ranked organisations decide which rankers they should work 
more closely with, how they should project their offerings to them, and what might be the most successful 
strategy for engaging with and influencing rankers.  
Scholars typically present a necessary arms-length relation between ranker and ranked (Free, Salterio and 
Shearer 2009). We have painted a picture instead of these experts building connections and constituting a 
network of relations. Rankers find it necessary to operate in close relationship with practitioners which 
provides the possibility not just of greater contact but deepened interaction/relations. Analyst relations play 
a mediating role that links up different actors within and beyond the boundaries of the organisation. These 
kinds of interstitial transformations open a channel for information and influence to be exchanged and 
traded. We build on Sauder and Fine (2008) who call for studies that consider not simply how people react to 
rankings but also how they are ‘involved’ with them, and we discuss the notion of a ‘ranking chain’ which 
questions the notion that rankings are always produced autonomously and result from dyadic relationships.  
We sought to understand the role of ranked organisations and agencies in mapping influence. These are the 
practices to find which rankings ‘count’ or ‘make a difference’ in a product or service area. What we have 
shown is how organisations cannot respond to all measures in the same way. To get “very reactive, very 
quickly”, as one informant describes, is seen a mistake or act of naivety by these specialists. Analyst relations 
experts will thus attempt to work out which are the important rankings, to which they must respond, as well 
as how to do this (Chenhall, Hall and Smith 2013).  
Just as rankers influence the shape of technology fields by articulating evaluation principles (Sauder 2008), 
ranked organisations are now involved in their own classification and reworking of the evaluative ecosystem, 
through creating distinctions. These specialists have constructed new discriminations to differentiate rankers 
according to their perceived importance and influence. This means they give form to properties and relative 
positions hitherto not defined (e.g. rankers are categorised as ‘dealmakers', ‘talking heads', ‘wannabees' 
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etc.). These distinctions are not insignificant. They create the opportunity for ranked organisations to treat 
the rankers differently, which means that these new forms of ‘ranking of the rankers’ genuinely become 
constraining. 
These four techniques are clearly interrelated, and it is their conjunction that allows for the creation of the 
ranking chain described above. It is through such a chain that ranked organisations garner room for 
manoeuvre in what some have described as the most constraining of contexts (Elsbach and Kramer 1996, 
Sauder 2008, Sauder and Espeland 2009). We now turn to illustrate the idea of this more flexible response, 
and give some suggestions as to the new kinds of relations that are emerging between ranker and ranked. 
Organisational Responses to Multiple Rankings 
Scholars typically present rankings as a materialised institution patterning action which organisations have 
little choice but to bend to (Sauder and Espeland 2009, Shore and Wright 2015). However, Martin's (2005: 
702) also noted how "organisations vary in their adaptation to rankings". Likewise, in talking about similar 
kinds of performance object, Power (2015: 51) flags the non-deterministic aspects of performance 
information and how ‘noncompliance’ and ‘resistance’ are always possible. How might we take account of 
these contrasting positions?  
We have shown how the creation of these new chains of influence makes the proliferation of rankings and 
the wider ‘ecosystem’ of measures increasingly understandable, and perhaps because of this more 
malleable. We suggest the above techniques constitute a distinct form of response where organisations can 
build their relationship with (multiple) rankings in different directions. The separation we have made above 
between navigation and (re)negotiation exhibits similarities to how one might traverse a difficult terrain. 
There were rankings, because they found to be obligatory points of passage, which had to be navigated 
towards. Here reactive conformance was a real possibility as certain rankers were seen to be so influential 
that the organisation would have little choice but to adapt itself to the ranking, leading perhaps to the 
‘isomorphic’ pressures described by Gioia and Corley (2002) and others. There were also rankers that while 
potentially negative or unreceptive towards the ranked organisation could simply be side-stepped or 
navigated around. These internal experts could calculate the relevance and import of a ranking and judge it 
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not necessarily important enough to warrant a response. This observation throws light on Martin (2005) and 
Power’s (2015) question as to how and why organisations might sometimes resist or ignore rankings.  
Ranked organisations could also exercise a certain amount of discretion about which rankings to accept as 
fixed and which to attempt to negotiate. At the most basic level, this could mean for the organisation to 
negotiate itself onto a ranking where it had previously been excluded or to relocate to a more favourable 
rank position. More advanced forms of negotiation could involve shaping the evaluative criteria of a ranking 
or even the creation of a new ranking version for an emerging/diverging technological area. Certain of these 
specialists conceived their influence not simply regarding the immediate goals of establishing new versions 
of a ranking but also in the longer-term aims to rework or renegotiate the evaluative ecosystem. Ranked 
organisations find advantage in supporting the growth of new ranking firms. Sustaining or building diversity 
seemingly gives them greater room for manoeuvre. An organisation excluded from a ranking because it did 
not fit the rankers’ established taxonomy, would be able to identify other, smaller or more specialised 
ranking firms open and receptive to their perspectives.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Given that the auditing of performance is now discussed by scholars both within and well beyond 
accounting, our interest is in exploring what the various social science traditions can learn from each other 
(Chapman, Cooper and Miller 2009). The main contribution of the paper is to propose a framework that 
provides analytical resources for the study of contexts characterised by a plurality of measures. 
From conforming to transforming 
Our first contribution is to respond to Strathern (1997) and Espeland and Sauder's (2007) call for the study of 
the reflexive interactions between measures and organisations. We also take account of Dahler-Larsen’s 
(2012) argument that analytical frameworks need to able to account for both the ranking and the broader 
organisational transformations triggered. The dominant thesis (characterised here as ‘reactive 
conformance’) does capture transformation, but this is often depicted as a ‘knee jerk’ reflex with unintended 
behavioural effects (such as ‘gaming’) (Espeland and Sauder 2007). This narrowly constitutive view where 
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ranked organisations become “acutely attuned” and responsive to the extent of ‘revising’ organisational 
practices (Scott and Orlikowski 2012: 38) no longer seems to suffice in the case of more plural systems.  
Reflexive transformation attempts, by contrast, to capture how multiple rankings are a generative force not 
exclusively in the sense of moving an organisational environment towards a ranking but also through 
creating or forcing greater interplay and entanglements between organisations, rankings and the wider 
ecosystem. In discussing various aspects of reflexive transformation, we have moved beyond the idea that 
ranked organisations are passive/conforming and shown instead how multiple rankings increase the impulse 
for (i) self-transformation e.g. the development of new kinds of calculative expertise. These specialists have a 
role in creating various processes of mutual shaping between ranker(s) and ranked. Through the 
development of a ranking chain they can (ii) transform the rankings themselves e.g. ranked positon, 
evaluation criteria, creating new rankings etc. Finally, through providing resources and incentives for the 
emergence of new ranking players, ranked organisations contribute to (iii) reworking the composition of the 
evaluative ecosystem.  
Moreover, this tripartite conception of organisations, rankings and ecosystem moves us beyond a focus on 
dyads and the black-boxing of the (often rich) interactions between ranker and ranked.5 Reflexive 
transformation might also more usefully be conceived as concerned with providing not for a ranking’s 
disciplining effects but a spectrum of possible outcomes. We have shown how ranked organisations have 
learnt to navigate an ecosystem characterised by multiple asymmetrical relations between the various 
classes of player. It is these kinds of more dynamic depictions, we would argue that might allow scholars 
insight into some of the ‘generative frictions’ (Stark 2009, Chenhall, Hall and Smith 2013) present in 
situations of multiple rankings. We want to now turn to how the notion of reflexive transformation might 
help scholars develop research along these lines.  
The implications of multiple rankings for ranking scholarship 
Another contribution of our approach is to open alternative vistas on the consequences of rankings and 
other kinds of performance information. Shore and Wright (2015: 422) argue that the spread of auditing to 
                                                     
5 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging us to make this point. 
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new domains, through the expansion of rankings, has brought about a wholesale transformation as 
organisations and actors are “incentivised to compete and perform according to the new norms of 
accounting”. As organisational activities became “increasingly focused on the measures by which their 
performance is judged” (ibid: 422), scholars have suggested that rankings are an ‘unmanageable constraint’ 
(Elsbach and Kramer 1996, Sauder 2008, Sauder and Espeland 2009); that they produce acute pressures 
which those ranked find difficult “to buffer” (Sauder and Espeland 2009: 78); they constrain organisations 
“to focus on an externally defined ideal of organisational performance” (Martins 2005: 715); and where the 
those ranked are mostly ‘passive’ or ‘compliant’ (Gioia and Corley 2002, Wedlin 2006). However, these 
characterisations no longer seem to fully capture all situations – especially the highly dynamic areas 
described here. Indeed, it is worth noting that Espeland and Sauder (2007: 23) themselves pointed to the 
possibility that mechanisms of reactivity "produce varied changes over time" and that the "initial responses 
[to a ranking] will be different from those coming later" (see also Espeland and Sauder 2016). However, 
these interesting suggestions have so far remained undeveloped in the literature. In this respect, in setting 
out reflexive transformation we are not arguing for the superiority of this approach, but to demonstrate its 
complementarity with existing work. This is namely, how reactive conformance and reflexive transformation 
are subsets of the more encompassing reactivity process (e.g. the former might be understood as a ‘first-
order’ reaction while the latter a ‘second-order’ response). 
The proliferation of rankings has created the impulse for more local forms of control. The drive for 
specialisation and proactivity within ranked organisations, we argue, arose in response to a world in which 
traditional reactivity had become inadequate. Supported and propelled by new forms of calculative 
expertise, organisations have found ways to buffer and mitigate some of the adverse effects of this form of 
audit. Our analysis points to the various interactions and mutual influence that may “deaccelerate the 
reactivity”, as one informant described to us (personal communication, DC). This suggests a different kind of 
effect than rankings acting as an external iron law (Humphrey and Owen 2000, Hazelkorn 2011, Espeland 
and Sauder 2016).  
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Protecting organisations from adverse implications, however, is only one side of reflexive transformation. 
The other is how it presents organisations with the potential for ‘proactivity' (Wedlin 2006). The ‘flood’ of 
rankings is in significant ways less ‘totalising’ than we are often urged to believe (Shore and Wright 2015). 
Those ranked no longer appear to fear measures as they once did. This builds on Mennicken’s (2010: 54) 
discussion of how auditing firms sought not to ‘escape’ but to “actively embrace” and “shape” new rankings 
(since they could help the organisation gain “public visibility” and signal “quality and leadership” in the field). 
Likewise, we saw how organisations could not only welcome rankings but even champion and encourage 
their further introduction. Additional rankings were welcomed because they provided occasions for 
organisations to distinguish themselves from competitors; for those excluded from the initial ranking they 
offered a second opportunity to gain entrance; and for those already placed, they provided further 
opportunities for an improved position.  
This brings us to the debate about whether multiple rankings are positive or negative. Work within the 
sociology of worth suggests the former because an increase in performance information creates a 
‘productive friction’ (Stark 2009, Chenhall, Hall and Smith 2013). We would agree. A plethora of voices is 
useful to redress the acute asymmetry between ranker and ranked in an oligopolistic ranking system (Sauder 
and Espeland 2006). However, not all friction turns out to be productive. Multiple evaluative principles can 
also create complexity and confusion so that, as Stark (ibid: 27) himself notes, “nothing is accomplished”. 
Reflexive transformation throws light on how organisations turn multiple rankings to their advantage. It is 
not merely the number and diversity of rankings that is productive, as Stark (ibid) suggests, but in being able 
to make sense of and move between them (Chenhall, Hall and Smith 2013). When rankers themselves are 
ranked, this provides enticing opportunities for organisations to navigate to - and around - measures. It 
follows, therefore, that when the importance of rankers can be measured and made explicit that their 
outputs no longer function as before, e.g. in inducing reactive conformance, because ranked organisations 
will have learnt to negotiate between and around them. 
We suggest that the problem of plurality has important implications for accounting scholars, for the 
dynamics where organisations are presented with many as opposed to a few rankings will be significantly 
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different (Stark 2009). Thus far, scholars interested in audit have developed analytical templates honed on 
the study of a single set of evaluative principles (Miller and Power 2013). We mention one example which 
has been widely taken up not just in accounting but across the social sciences. This is the axiom that when 
features of an organisation are singled out for measurement that they become ‘targets’ (Hoskin 1996, 
Strathern 1997). Strathern (1997) popularised this in her study of the UK university research assessment 
exercise, and it has since been developed as an important theme/lens guiding researcher interest (see for 
example Power 2015).6 It is questionable, however, as to whether concepts honed on the study of one or a 
few performance measurement systems apply as well in the case of multiple performance objects. This is 
because, as demonstrated, multiplicity complicates the reflexive interactions between organisations and 
measures. To paraphrase Stark (2009), those who are subject to many targets are also those who are subject 
to none (Greenwood et al. 2011 make a similar point). Or perhaps, according to our schema, those exposed 
to multiple measures will have to find ways to sort and prioritise the targets to be aimed for, which has led 
to the development of the new forms of calculative response discussed here.  
Future research directions 
Shore and Wright (2015: 422) argue above that, through rankings, the tools and processes of audit are 
spreading to new domains. This is undoubtedly true but there is also an argument that just as they can 
spread out from a source, they can also loop back (Strathern 1997). But if they do, we find they will not be 
the same, but translated. The repurposing of established audit practices could take many forms. We note the 
paradox that ranked organisations now expose rankers to some of the same kinds of audit process to which 
they themselves were subjected. In his original work, Power (1994) noted the irony that audit had mostly 
been insulated from itself. Likewise, till now, rankers appeared to be exempt the influence of their own 
measures. Our empirical material provides early evidence for the growth in a new ‘industry’ of expertise who 
turn the methods of the rankers back onto these same actors – perhaps countering their dominance. There 
is also evidence that the new forms of expertise identified in this paper are spreading. For instance, there are 
                                                     
6 Talking about the rise of ‘impact’ as a measure of academic performance, Power’s (2015) depicts an interactional 
process where researchers orient towards and define themselves in relation to the new target.  
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more than casual relations between analyst relations and 'rating agency relations' (Duff and Einig 2015) and 
'investor relations' (Davis et al., 2012). It is possible therefore that the forms of response identified here may 
become a feature of audit and performance information more generally. This suggests the possibility for a 
‘turn’ in accounting research, one that investigates a further ‘devolving’ of the audit process as noted by 
Shore and Wright (2015), where less established actors rank the judgement and influence of more 
entrenched experts. The aim would be to (re)think what these alternative accountings - and here studies of 
new audit formats like TripAdvisor (Jeacle and Carter 2011, Scott and Orlikowski 2012) and IMDb (Bialecki, 
O’Leary and Smith 2017) appear instructive - will have on the power and influence of established producers 
of performance information.  
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